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LOW-COST QUICK-LOOK RADIATION TESTING OF
ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS FOR THE MARS OBSERVER CAMERA
S. M. Brylow and T. A. Soulanille*
Altadena Instruments Corporation
Pasadena, California 91105

Abstract
The development of modern electronics has far outstripped the inventory of components for which
radiation tolerance has been determined and published. New component characteristics require a
more integrated approach to radiation tolerance in
system design. The Mars Observer Camera performance requirements could not be met with a design
restricted to components of established radiation
hardness. A balanced approach that intimately involved radiation effects in the system design process
was required. This included low-cost, quick
turnaround testing of total ionizing dose and heavy
ion induced single event phenomena of upset and
latchup. The results were used to inform the system
design, which had to adapt to real component susceptibilities. Test results directly affected component
selection, radiation shielding, and the data path and
software architectures.
1. Introduction

Radiation resistance of electronic components is a
significant factor in system design for a variety of
earth-orbiting and interplanetary missions. To illustrate how radiation concerns interact with system
design, this paper discusses radiation tolerance issues in the design of the Mars Observer Camera
(MOC).

scope. Its 0.42° field of view covers 3 km at 1.5 meters
per pixel from a 380 km polar sun-synchronous orbit.
Two wide field (140°) imaging systems use similar
CCD's with 3456 photosites to cover Mars limb-tolimb in red and blue bands at 250 meters per pixel at
the nadir. (The MOC investigation is described in 1
and the instrument development in 2 .)
2. System Requirements

The MOC is nadir-fixed on the spacecraft. The
ground-track speed, the required resolution and
number of pixels in the cross-track dimension to impose a pixel rate of 5 Megapixels per second. This exceeds the spacecraft data system bandwidth by 103 ,
requiring an image buffer in the MOC. It further requires an analog signal chain of high video bandwidth.
The absence of pointing control limits opportunities
to image a particular target to a few per mission, requiring that the MOC be able to acquire and store
multiple images. Images from the telescope are
nominally 2k x 2k pixels quantized to 8 bits, so a raw
image requires 4M bytes. The image buffer was required to provide three times this capacity, or 12M
bytes.
Image compression was required to make effective
use of the limited downlink capability of Mars
Observer, as well as to extend the capacity of the image buffer. The substantial pixel-level redundancy
in real images allows scientific interpretation of
images with bad pixels; compressing out that redundancy results in data that is intolerant of errors.
Requirements on bit error rates are therefore more
relaxed for raw data than compressed data.

The NASA Mars Observer mission, managed by the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and planned for a
late September 1992 launch, involves a year of interplanetary cruise followed by one Mars year (two
Earth years) of mapping orbits. Dr. Michael Malin
is the Principal Investigator for the MOC, the camera
on Mars Observer. Caltech was responsible for designing and delivering the instrument; Altadena
Instruments provided systems and detailed engineering for that effort.

The MOC is required to operate autonomously for
days from stored commands, and to provide extensive data editing, variable resolution, and variable
image compression capabilities by command. A capable microprocessor control and data processing
system was imperative.

The principal science objectives of the MOC investigation require targeted meter-scale resolution images of kilometer-scale scenes, and global coverage
of Mars at kilometer-scale resolution in red and blue
colors on week time scales. The MOC high resolution imager uses a CCD line array of 2048 photosensitive elements in a pushbroom configuration at
the focal plane of a 35 cm aperture reflecting tele*Members, AIAA
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a. Resources &

Instruments sought a radiation resistant buffer design that could be built using real components.

Constraints

The shielding provided by the telescope and electrQnics enclosure was calculated for different locations
within the electronics package and affected parts
placement. Spot shielding of individual components
was an option to reduce mission TD to < 5 krads
where needed.

Power, mass and volume contraints were commensurate with intermediate-scale planetary spacecraft.
The MOC was initially limited to 9 kg (much of
which was required by the telescope) and 7 watts average. The anticipated Total Dose (TD) of ionizing
radiation behind various shielding densities was
provided by JPL. It was aproximately 10 krad behind
0.4 g/cm 2 of aluminum. JPL also provided integral
flux (Heinrich curve) estimates fQr the heavy ions
that cause Single Event Upset (SEU) and Single
Event Latchup (SEL) in susceptible components.

Heavy ions of solar or galactic origin can produce
enough ionization per unit length of travel (Linear
Energy Transfer, or LET) to disturb a small-geometry IC with the passage of a single ion. A transient or
persistent logic state change can result, referred to as
a Single Event Upset (SEU). If a PNPN structure exists between the power rails, as is incidental to many
CMOS processes, the deposited charge can turn on
this parasitic SCR if certain conditions are met.
This effect is termed Single Event Latchup (SEL).

4. Component Reauirements
The MOC required what were high-performance
components in 1986 to meet its performance requirements within the system constraints. An opamp of order 60 MHz bandwidth and 10 ns rise time
for 100 mW, and a 5M sample per second 8-bit AID
for < 250 m W were needed for the analog signal
chain. The image buffer needed a 150 ns 1 Megabit
RAM for < 20 mW quiescent. Instrument control
and data processing required a > 0.5 MIPS 32-bit microprocessor and over lOOk bytes of RAM and ROM.
Digital Application Specific Integrated Circuits
(ASICs) clocked at 20 MHz were required to provide
control and data paths to tie the system together.

The metric for the significance of SEU in various
components was its effect on science data return.
Pixel error rates of 10-3 are quite acceptable, so the
analog processing chain could be allowed occasional
transients, and raw pixel data could be stored in
SEU-sensitive memory. An error in compressed image data could scramble a quarter million pixels, so
some measure was required to protect those data.
Likewise, damage to stored instrument commands
could cause the loss of multiple images.

Most of these were not available as proven radiationresistant components in 1986. For example, a 4 kbit
space-qualified SRAM was available3 and a 16 kbit
component was under development. An impractical
4,000 of these latter components would have been required to implement the minimum image buffer.
We were forced outside the confines of the Preferred
Parts Lists.

An upset in logic circuitry in the controVdata path
could damage an image acquisition. An upset in the

'CPU or the stack would cause unpredictable errors,
possibly damaging data or causing a program
crash. A bit flip in the program execution store is
more serious still, requiring a program reload from
on-board ROM or from the ground in the worst case.
Component SEU and system error detection and recovery requirements had to be balanced in response
to these considerations.

5. System Approach to Rad Resistance

The realities of using ordinary military and commercial components in space required a system approach to radiation resistance. The decision was
made early in the program that it was not effective to
demand all system level radiation performance
requirements be met at the component level. The selected approach was to design a radiation tolerant
system rather than simply design a system and populate it with radiation hard components. This does
not eliminate the need to find and utilize radiation
tolerant components but it does allow the designer
more flexibility in designing for a potentially damaging radiation environment. For example, rather
than require an absolutely radiation resistant RAM
with which to construct the image buffer, Altadena

Latchup
The effects of latchups were similarly considered,
with the additional problem that an uncontrolled
component latchup might crash the power supply or
destroy the part by overheating, Some components
are intrinically immune to SEL by design, e.g. single transistors and CMOS silicon on insulator IC's
do not contain 4-layer PNPN structures. Others have
demonstrated SEU/SEL immunity. CMOS on sufficiently thin epitaxial layers with sufficient substrate
conductivity can be latchup immune. CD4000 series
CMOS logic, with its huge feature size, is available
SEU/SEL immune.
2
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Fixturin~

Since latchup of incidental PNPN structures requires a certain sustaining current, if that current is
sufficiently higher than the operating .current the
component can be prevented from latching up by
series resistors in .the power leads. Where the only
parts that can do the job are latchup susceptible it is
necessary to sense and clear latchups by power cycling the component, a technique rarely used in
19864.

Test fixturing for the memories was implemented on
a plug-in card in an IBM PC type computer. Access
times could be varied and the devices read and written under program control. Memory bit integrity
tests were implemented in software, and results were
recorded to floppy disk. DRAM refresh times were
measured and found to correlate with dosage 5 .
Device IDD was measured and logged.

6. Testin« Prouam
Candidate AID's were tested in another plug-in
card. A 4k x 10 bit RAM was read out into a 10-bit
video D/A converter whose output was buffered into
the devices under test. That system was operated at
the 200ns per sample required of the AID in the MOC,
and the converter output captured by another RAM.
The stimulus RAM was written and the response
RAM read by the PC. A slow ramp was used to test DC
linearity, with sawtooth and step stimuli to determine dynamic performance.

Candidate components that met the other system criteria of performance, power consumption, package
suitability and anticipated reliability were tested for
radiation resistance. These included op-amps, analog switches, a voltage to frequency converter, 8-bit
flash AID converters, several static and dynamic
RAM, UVEPROM, and a microprocessor.

Total Dose
Total dose testing was performed by exposing components to 1.17 and 1.33 MeV photons from 60Co decay, at Sandia National Laboratory's Gamma
Irradiation Facility and in a 60Co cell at UCLA.
Dose rates ranged from 150 rads per minute up to 2500
rads per minute at the upper doseages, necessarily
far exceeding those expected during the three-year
mission.

The microprocessor was tested in a small standalone system that had an RS-232 serial connection to
the test PC. The clock speed was switch-selectable.
An EPROM in the test system contained a test program that announced its results via the serial port.
Op-amps were irradiated in amplifier configurations that served as test fixtures for input bias.
Amplified bias was measured by digital voltmeter.
Irradiated components were tested later on the bench
for video characteristics. The voltage to frequency
converter was tested in a fixture that operated it at a
reference voltage. Output was measured with a frequency counter.

In testing digital components, ten samples of each
part were typically used, with eight being irradiated
and two kept as controls. During irradiation three
devices were powered with inputs biased high, three
powered with inputs biased low, and two unpowered.
No measurements were made while the devices under test were being irradiated.

Results

Component testing outside the radiation cell was alternated with irradiation inside, with time outside
limited to less than 1 hour per cycle. Irradiation proceeded in increasing incremental doses until all
components failed or functionality to 100 krad had
been demonstrated.

Results of digital component testing are summarized in Table 1. We had the good fortune of discovering a high-capacity (in 1986) DRAM that provided
a significant margin in total dose resistance over
the expected environment.

Some of the analog components were tested in-situ in
this fashion. Some late tests were conducted by irradiating samples and testing them on the bench a few
days later. In this case samples of 12 devices were
typically used, with two unirradiated controls and
two of each device type removed from exposure at
each of five radiation levels.

~

Table 1 - Total Dose Testing of Digital Devices
~
MlUll!f Parameter Function 12!

MM884256-15
DRAM
Fujitsu
bit faults
6 krad
D43256C-lOL
DRAM
NEe
bit faults
15 krad
DRAM
Toshiba
bit faults
6 krad
TC55257PL-1O
M411024PP·15
DRAM
ATT
bit faults >80 krad
ATT
bit faults >61 krad
M41256HPM-15B DRAM
TC511000P-1O
DRAM
Toshiba
bit faults
15 krad
SMJ27C256-15
EPROM 11
bit faults
6 krad
*For purposes of this table, functional is the level up to which no
memory errors were seen. Performance may have been acceptable
to higher levels, but this is the earliest point at which data was
lost.
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The EPROM tested showed some bit errors at a dose
approximately equal to the expected mission dose, but
recovered ("annealed") in the subsequent weeks. We
nevertheless made system adaptations described below.

Sources
Traditional single event testing employs large accelerators such as the cyclotrons at Berkeley or
Brookhaven. They provide good control of LET and
flux over a range of LET from 0.002 MeV I (mglcm2 )
to beyond 40 MeV I (mglcm 2 ). Unfortunately, time
on these machines must be scheduled months in advance and costs tens of thousands of dollars a day6.
We were constrained by schedule and budget to using other. sources.

Table 2 shows the results of total dose testing of analog devices.
Table 2 - Total Dose Testing of Analog Devices
Inm
.MlmDf
Parameter
Function 12!

~

SD2IS
DFET
Topaz
Vp
40 krad
Ana. Sw.
Topaz
Ron. Va. Vd
40 krad
CDG308
HAS141
Op-amp
Hanis
VO&.Ib
25 krad
HA5147
Op-amp
Hanis
V05' Ib
40 krad
Hanis
VO&.Ib
25 krad
HA5152
Op-amp
EL2020
Op-amp
Elantec
Vos> Ib
100 krad
LM 131
Va>
NatSemi fout
40 krad
NO
RCA
linearity
6 krad
CA3318
*For purposes of this table, functional is the level up to which the
measured parameters remained within their maximum allowable
data sheet values. Performance in a particular application may
have been acceptable to higher levels.

We used three sources of ions for single event testing. Americium provided the low end of our scale;
Am241 decays with half-life 458y by emission of
5.5MeV (X particles of LET = 0.6 MeV I (mglcm 2 ).
Californium provided the high end; C~52 decays
with half-life 2.65y, 97% by (X emission and 3% by
spontaneous fission producing fragments of LET
clustered about 43 MeV I (mglcm2)7.

SEUISEL

The Caltech tandem Van de Graaf accelerator was
operated to provide ions in the range of 0.7 to 7 MeV I
(mg/cm 2 ). This left the range from 7 to 42 MeV I
(mg/cm 2 ) unmeasured, requiring that we make the
worst-case assumption that the cross-section observed at 42 MeV I (mglcm 2 ) was the cross-section
for all LET above 7 MeV I (mglcm2).

Testing for SEU and SEL requires a different approach. The radiation effect is not cumulative with
exposure, since the issue is the susceptibility of components to single ionizing events, which is a function of the amount of charge deposited in the sensitive
region of the device. It is necessary to test with a
range of ionization densities, or LET's. The device
under test must be operated during exposure, and
must be under vacuum with the die exposed in order
to use laboratory sources of suitable ions.

Fixturing
The stand-alone microprocessor system used in total
dose testing was adapted for operation in vacuum to
provide a fixture for processor and memory single
event testing. The lid was pried off the package of the
device under test, and the die was exposed to the ion
source in a vacuum chamber. Software provided a
continuous memory test that reported and cleared
upsets at each pass through the memory, allowing
rapid testing (> 500 upsets per second) at high ion
fluxes. A microprocessor test program was used
when the processor was in the beam, which tested not
only the normal registers but instruction decode, the
ALU data path, and whatever else could send the processor execution awry. A deadman timer provided a
reset when the program got lost. Results were reported via the serial port, across a vacuum feedthru
and into a test PC for logging.

Device susceptibility to SEU or SEL is described in
terms of an effective cross-section for the effect as a
function of LET. The expected event rate for that
component in a particular environment is calculated by integrating the product of expected flux and
measured cross-section across the LET spectrum. A
given device will have a threshold LET below which
there is no effect, and typically for simple devices
such as memories, a saturation LET above which the
cross-section does not increase. At the higher LET
end of the spectrum the flux in space drops off exponentially, so the integration can be performed over a
finite range of LET. The testing problem then is to
find the LET threshold and measure the cross-section from that LET up to saturation. For devices
which do not show SEU or SEL in testing the problem
is to establish by exposure to a sufficient fluence of a
sufficiently high LET that the probability of upset or
latchup in the expected environment can be considered zero for engineering purposes.

Since latchup was an issue during exposure as well,
SEL testing was conducted simultaneously. A
latchup during SEU testing would otherwise seriously confuse the upset measurement process. The
4
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power supply for the device under test was instrumented to provide a voltage proportional to the current being drawn. This voltage was measured by an
AID converter card within the test PC. Test software
provided an adjustable current threshold for latchup
detection. When the threshold was exceeded th~ device was allowed to dwell in that condition for a
fraction of a second to provide measurement of the
current drawn in the latched condition, a quantity
needed for the design of the flight latchup detection
circuitry. Software then commanded the power supply off and back on to clear the latchup, and logged
the event.

faster than software could apply the ECC to it.
Consequently the pixel data path hardware was required to calculate the ECC.

The expected mean SEL rate of 1 latchup in the 96
DRAMs every 36 days required latchup sense and
recovery. The data path architecture produced two
buffers of 3M words 16 bits wide. The current draw of
the M411024 in the latched state is only of order five
times operating current when being accessed, so 16
current sensors were employed per buffer, one for
each bit position. Any of these can trigger a power cycle. A mosfet switch in the VDD line that supplies the
48 devices in a buffer, normally saturated on, is cyResults
cled off for aproximately 2 ms to clear the latchup.
During that time it is necessary to gate low all logic
The measured cross-sections for upset and latchup connections to the unpowered DRAM's to keep from
were multiplied by the expected environment, under holding up the power rail through their input protecthe pessimistic assumption that the cross-section in tion diodes. Since the bits are stored as charges on
the LET range between two measurements was equal' capacitors rather than currents through transistors
to the higher measurement (always at the higher as in SRAM, data in the DRAM is retained through
LET). The integral of this product as a function of the SEL-clearing power cycle.
LET gave expected mean rates for SEU and SEL for
the mission, shown in Table 3.
The microprocessor system presented a different
problem. Sandia National Laboratories completed
Table 3 - Single Event Testing of Devices
development of the SA3300, a "war-protected" verSEUatMars
SELatMars
sion of the National Semiconductor NS32C016 that we
I&m
MiImf
1.7 x 10-4
1.7 x 10- 4
SMJ27C256-15
11
had tested, in time for us to incorporate it in the de4.3xlO- 1
4.8xlO- 1
NatSemi
NS32C016
sign. According to their testing this part would have
6
3.0xlOUTD212R
3.0xlO- 6
UlMC
a mean upset interval longer than the mission dura1
4
M411024PP-15
2.9xlOAT&T
8.4x10
6
6
tion, as well as providing a total dose margin of a
3.0xlOHC6264B
Honeywell
3.0xlOfactor of more than ten. In this era Honeywell developed a 16k x 8 CMOS SRAM with similar hardness,
7. Desitm
providing a place for the opcode store, processor stack
and
working variables.
The system design grew from the ends toward the
middle, top down from architecture and bottom up
from component capabilities and susceptibilities. In For efficiency in testing, and to avoid having to
accord with the philosophy of not requiring the com- upload what turned out to be 256k bytes of program
ponents to meet all of the system-level radiation re- and data tables during flight, non-volatile memory
quirements, designs were studied which would allow to retain the program was required. The flight software development schedule did not allow the use of
tolerance of radiation effects.
mask-programmed ROM, so the tested EPROM was
The AT&T 1M bit DRAM was selected for the 12M used. Despite the observed post-irradiation annealbyte data buffer, providing a design margin for total ing, we elected to provide spot shielding to lower the
dose greater than a factor of five. The SEU and SEL expected dose to half the dose at which bit errrors were
susceptibilities presented design problems. The ex- first observed. We further decided that this device
pected SEU-induced bit error rate of 8x10- 5 per day was not suitable to respond to opcode fetches, and
was acceptable for uncompressed images, but some adapted the system architecture as follows.
form of error correction was required for compressed
data. A block Error Correction Code (ECC) was se- When power is applied to the MOC, the system is
lected that corrects two bad bits in 256 for an overhead cold-reset and the processor starts execution at its
of 16 bits. Flight software writes and reads blocks of standard startup address. Its address and data
error-sensitive data through routines which apply the busses connect only to an ASIC, the Control Gate
ECC and use it to correct errors. We adopted a re- Array (CGA). The CGA services read requests in the
quirement to provide compression of the 5M pixel per startup address range by reading from three separate
second data stream between the AID converter and EPROMs and triplicate-voting the result to arrive at
the data buffer, producing error-sensitive data much the value provided to the processor. The bootstrap

5

routine executes in this way. The body of the flight
software is stored in the EPROM with the same ECC
as used in the DRAM buffer. It is read out and errors
are corrected by the bootstrap program, and stored in
hard SRAM, to which execution is transferred when
it is in place.

The work described was supported by Caltech contract 65Q-784942.
10. References

Power considerations left no choice but to use the
CA3318 CMOS SOS flash AID, despite its susceptibility to total dose. It was placed near the center of the
board to receive maximum shielding from the 3.5kg
primary mirror directly above it, and surrounded
the package with as much spot shielding as we could
fit. The expected total dose to this component was
thereby limited to 3kRad, a factor of one-half of the
dose where degradation was observed.
Latchup in analog components was addressed by
multiple means. The analog switches had a low
enough operating current that series resistors in the
power leads could be used to keep the device below its
latchup sustain current. To provide overall protection of the analog power rails, overcurrent power cycling was integrated with low-headroom dual tracking linear "skimmer" FET post-regulators, incidently providing 20 dB rejection of the power supply
switching frequency, and logic-level on-off control
of the circuit block. The turn-on dV/dT was limited
to 250 VIs to keep well below the rate where charging
the bypass capacitors would trigger an overcurrent
cycle.
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8. Summary

Modern space systems in constrained resource environments can benefit from an integrated systemlevel approach to radiation resistance. This requires determining the radiation susceptibility of
candidate components. Radiation susceptibility can
be determined to a level sufficient to interact with the
system design process in a rapid and comparatively
inexpensive fashion. Altadena Instruments' development of the Mars Observer Camera has demonstrated this approach in a NASA planetary space
mission context.
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